When Truces Collapse: A Longitudinal Study of Price-Adjustment Routines
通过一家制造企业的价格调整过程纵向研究，揭示了惯例中休战的微观基础，表明惯例既有稳定性也有变化，重大价格变动会引发冲突，惯例是包含冲突的适应性表现。
We analyze the microfoundations of the routine in a study of price-adjustment processes at a manufacturing firm. Existing theory says that truces balance cognitive and motivational differences across functions, but there is scant evidence on how truces work. We show both stability and change in routines. For minor price adjustments, routines incorporate truces in stable but separate market interpretations by the sales and marketing groups. Major price changes put truces at risk, as latent conflict over information and interests becomes overt. The ensuing battle shows how interests, information, and truces are intertwined in performing the routine. Routines are not just stable entities, but adaptive performances that include conflict. We illustrate how our approach addresses fundamental problems such as how firms perform economics, how routines incorporate economic theory, and how routines shape macroeconomic dynamics. We argue that our approach can be extended to any routine-based organizational work.