Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
证明，在有限期且卖方无法承诺未来行为的模型中，每期报一个固定价格是最大化收入的销售机制。卖方有一件物品，买方估值是私人信息，卖方有全部议价能力。
This paper establishes that posting a price in each period is a revenue-maximizing allocation mechanism in a finite period model without commitment. A risk-neutral seller has one object to sell and faces a risk-neutral buyer whose valuation is private information and drawn from an arbitrary bounded subset of the real line. The seller has all the bargaining power: she designs a mechanism to sell the object at t, but if trade does not occur at t she can propose another mechanism at t + 1. We show that posting a price in each period is an optimal mechanism. A methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a procedure to characterize optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non-commitment that is valid irrespective of the structure of the agent's type. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.