Note on Self-Restraint as an Online Entry-Deterrence Strategy
用博弈论模型说明，在跨渠道价格一致性重要的市场中，实体零售商可通过不进入在线渠道来阻止纯电商进入；而在价格一致性不重要时，只有进入在线渠道并独立运营才能阻止进入。
We develop a game-theoretical model to show that in the markets where price consistency across channels is critical, an incumbent brick-and-mortar retailer can deter the online entry of a pure-play e-tailer by strategically refraining from entering online. In the markets where price consistency is not a constraint, we find that the incumbent can deter the e-tailer’s entry only if it enters online and credibly operates the online channel as an independent profit center. In other words, the incumbent must be willing to cannibalize its own brick-and-mortar business by charging a low online price. We also discuss some social welfare implications of retail online entry and the managerial insights of our analysis.