Reputation for cooperation: contingent benefits in alliance activity
将两企业联盟建模为带退出选项的重复囚徒困境博弈，通过实验发现声誉信息反而降低合作，并给出权变解释，对何时投资声誉及柠檬市场问题在联盟中的适用性有启示。
Abstract We model the two‐firm alliance as an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with an exit option and test several theoretical predictions in experimental studies regarding the effect of reputation information. Following the literature, we hypothesize that reputation benefits cooperation; however, our experimental results instead show that reputation decreases cooperation. A contingency explains this result while remaining consistent with the general proposition of reputation as beneficial in games of incomplete information. Implications include a recommendation for when to invest in reputation and whether the lemon's market story is applicable to alliance‐related inefficiencies. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.