Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs
通过实验室实验，研究公司宽大处理计划对卡特尔定价和存活率的影响，发现该计划减少了卡特尔的形成，并降低了现有卡特尔的定价能力和存活率。
The number of cartels detected in the United States and in Europe has increased considerably since the introduction of corporate leniency programs in antitrust legislation. It cannot, however, be ruled out that this apparent success results in part from increased cartel activity. We explore the effects of corporate leniency programs on pricing and cartel activity by use of an experiment. We find that in the lab (i) fewer cartels are established when a leniency program is in place, and (ii) cartels that do exist are less successful in charging prices above the static Nash equilibrium price and have lower survival rates.