Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs
研究了公司上市时欺诈倾向如何随投资者对行业前景的信念变化，发现欺诈概率在信念中等时最高，极端高时反而下降，并分析了投资者监督和高管薪酬两种机制。
ABSTRACT We examine how a firm's incentive to commit fraud when going public varies with investor beliefs about industry business conditions. Fraud propensity increases with the level of investor beliefs about industry prospects but decreases when beliefs are extremely high. We find that two mechanisms are at work: monitoring by investors and short‐term executive compensation, both of which vary with investor beliefs about industry prospects. We also find that monitoring incentives of investors and underwriters differ. Our results are consistent with models of investor beliefs and corporate fraud, and suggest that regulators and auditors should be vigilant for fraud during booms.