Wage Interactions: Comparisons or Fall-Back Options?
研究工人有备选方案时，工资比较在薪酬谈判中的作用，利用1978-1989年英国化工行业321个工会谈判单位的面板数据，发现工资比较对工人很重要，支持“公平考虑”驱动工资互动的观点。
This paper examines the role played by wage comparisons in pay bargaining when workers have a fall-back option. The effect on wages due to wage comparisons can be difficult to distinguish from the effect of the fall-back wage. It is shown that the use of wages of a recognised ‘pay leader' resolves this problem. The empirical work employs a unique panel of data covering 321 unionised bargaining units in the UK chemicals industry between 1978 and 1989. Results support anecdotal reports of pay leadership and suggest that wages elsewhere matter because comparisons are important to workers. In this sense, the results support the notion that ‘fairness considerations' drive wage interactions.