THE SCOPE FOR PURE PROFITS IN A STANDARD LOCATION MODEL*
研究了标准区位模型中维持合谋均衡的条件，发现只有当市场区域和需求在一定范围内时合谋才可行，这解释了高需求时期和衰退期竞争定价行为更普遍的现象。
ABSTRACT. This paper examines the possibility of sustaining a collusive equilibrium in a standard location model. Drawing on recent developments in game theory, it is suggested that collusion is only feasible if market areas lie within a certain range. When market areas are large the threat of entry is likely to undermine any collusive agreement. In contrast when market areas are small, defection from the cartel is shown to be profitable. Thus collusion is shown to be feasible only when market areas and demand lie within certain bounds. More generally, this result appears to be consistent with the somewhat ambiguous empirical evidence which suggests that competitive pricing behavior is likely to prevail in periods of excessively high demand and during recessions.