Multidimensional Separating Equilibria and Moral Hazard: An Empirical Study of National Football League Contract Negotiations
利用1986至1991年NFL选秀球员的合同与表现数据，实证检验了合同谈判中的多维分离均衡，发现球员通过延迟签约和激励条款揭示私人信息，且合同结构影响努力水平。
This paper empirically tests for a multidimensional separating equilibrium in contract negotiations and tests for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in many contracts. Using contract and performance data on players drafted into the National Football League from 1986 through 1991, we find evidence that players use delay to agreement and incentive clauses to reveal their private information during contract negotiations. In addition, our empirical tests of the moral hazard issue indicate that a player's effort level is influenced by the structure of his contract. © 2003 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.