Optimal Financial Crises
基于实证证据，建立模型说明银行恐慌与商业周期相关，并指出在特定条件下银行挤兑可能是最优的，但引入成本或风险资产市场后，央行适当干预可改善福利。
ABSTRACT Empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of “sunspots.” Panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low. We develop a simple model of this. In this setting, bank runs can be first‐best efficient: they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios. However, if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced, central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a Pareto improvement in welfare.