Unions and Efficient Training
研究当受训工人可流动、工资合同时间一致且培训包含通用和专用技能时，企业最优培训投资水平。企业事后垄断力压低工资，而企业级工会通过工资谈判提高工资、减少离职，使培训量接近社会最优，提升社会福利。
The paper examines the optimal level of training investment when trained workers are mobile, wage contracts are time‐consistent, and training comprises both specific and general skills. The firm has ex post monopsonistic power that drives trained workers' wages below the social optimum. The emergence of a trade union bargaining at the firm‐level can increase social welfare, by counterbalancing the firm's ex post monopsonistic power in wage determination. Local union‐firm wage bargaining ensures that the post‐training wage is set sufficiently high to deter at least some quits, so that the number of workers the firm trains is nearer the social optimum