Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms
在非市场行为模型中引入理性利己者、条件合作者和自愿惩罚者等多类参与者，用间接演化方法解释这些类型如何在集体行动困境中生存，并探讨影响集体行动起源的情境变量与设计原则。
I assume multiple types of players--“rational egoists,” as well as “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers”--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.