Crime and Economic Incentives
利用1975-1996年英格兰和威尔士的警察辖区数据，发现低工资工人工资的相对下降会导致犯罪率上升，并验证了威慑措施和犯罪回报对犯罪的影响。
Abstract We explore the role that economic incentives, particularly changes in wages at the bottom end of the wage distribution, play in determining crime rates. We use data on the police force areas of England and Wales between 1975 and 1996 and find (relative) falls in the wages of low-wage workers lead to increases in crime. We carry out a number of experiments with different wage measures, including a wage measure that accounts for the effects of changes in the composition of employment. These reinforce the picture of a strong association between the low-wage labor market and crime. The result that incentives play a central role is reinforced further by the strong impact on crime of deterrence measures and of a measure of the returns to crime.