CEO Outside Directorships and Firm Performance: A Reconciliation of Agency and Embeddedness Views
研究了CEO在外部公司担任董事对企业长期绩效的影响，发现当企业面临增长竞争约束或战略聚焦时，这种外部任职有正面作用，调和了代理理论与嵌入性观点的争议。
A debate surrounds CEO outside board service and its contribution to firm performance. Agency scholars contend CEO outside directorships constitute a form of managerial opportunism that potentially detracts from internal responsibilities, but embeddedness scholars argue that directorship ties afford access to information and resources of important strategic utility. In an effort at reconciliation, we propose and test a midrange, contingency-based model receiving strong support in analysis of more than 400 large firms. CEO outside directorships are positively related to the long-term performance of firms facing competitive constraints on growth. They also benefit strategically focused firms more than highly diversified ones.