Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting
构建了一个代理模型，推导出长期债务、信用额度和股权作为最优证券，并捕捉了债务票息与期限、信用额度利率与限额、内外部股权、股利政策及资本结构动态等特征。
We develop an agency model of financial contracting. We derive long-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal securities, capturing the debt coupon and maturity; the interest rate and limits on the credit line; inside versus outside equity; dividend policy; and capital structure dynamics. The optimal debt-equity ratio is history dependent, but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and, in some cases, the severity of the agency problem. In our model, the agent can divert cash flows; we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort, or can control cash flow risk. , Oxford University Press.