Explaining CEO Compensation: How Do Talent, Governance, and Markets Fit In?
探讨CEO薪酬过高的原因，引用研究发现多数大公司未采用相对绩效评估，导致高管在牛市中获利，且最优秀的高管往往就职于不采用该评估的公司。
The article considers questions about excessive executive compensation. The author cites research by Shivaram Rajgopal and Terry Shevlin of the University of Washington, and Valentina Zamora of Boston College about why a majority of large U.S. firms reward chief executives for a bull market, rather than indexing pay to remove market effects, an approach known as relative performance evaluation. The researchers found that some executives set their own pay due to lack of shareholder oversight. The researchers also found that executive job prospects are market sensitive, so pay rises when demand rises because the overall market is strong. The primary finding was that the most talented executives tend to work at companies not using relative performance evaluation.