Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self‐Reporting Mechanism
提出一种基于监管者总量估算和渔民事前自我报告的税收机制，以解决非法上岸问题，确保接近最优的捕捞水平并产生正确的进出激励，并在丹麦鳕鱼渔业中模拟了该机制。
To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self‐reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low.