PROPRIETORIAL CONTROL IN FAMILY FIRMS: SOME FUNCTIONS OF ‘QUASI‐ORGANIC’ MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
研究了家族企业所有者如何通过“准有机”管理系统在授予高级经理自主权的同时保持决策特权，对研究家族企业治理和比较管理的人有用。
ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to investigate the strategies of managerial control which are used by the proprietors of family‐owned business enterprises. Interviews with the proprietors and senior managers of businesses in the building industry illustrate the ‘quasi‐organic’ nature of management structures. These grant some autonomy to senior managers without threatening proprietorial decision‐making prerogatives. Although the family firm has certain distinctive features, similar control strategies designed to ensure that delegated decisions are ‘reliable’ and ‘responsible’ are evident in various types of business enterprise. There is, then, scope for further comparative research within a conceptual framework which does not entirely divorce the family firm from other business organizations.