Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
研究群体内部和外部冲突同时存在时，权力不对称和成员努力互补性如何影响群体表现，发现更对称的群体内部冲突更激烈，但互补性高时外部努力可能更多，弱势方可能获得更高收益。
Abstract We investigate simultaneous inter‐ and intra‐group conflict in the shadow of within‐group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group‐conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group‐conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent‐dissipation is non‐monotonic with the within‐group power asymmetry.