Competitive intelligence and disclosure
研究了竞争情报活动如何影响企业获取和披露信息，发现信息披露取决于信息对竞争企业的相对有用性，在古诺竞争和产品差异化时更少披露，在伯特兰竞争时更多披露。
Competitive intelligence (CI) activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information. We show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less (more) likely with Cournot (Bertrand) competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies. When CI costs are independent of information characteristics, each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a Bertrand competitor with customer information. Only when the cost advantage is sufficiently great does each firm seek information useful to itself and its rival.