Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly
研究竞争如何影响企业向消费者披露产品质量的动机，发现即使披露成本很小，随着竞争企业数量增加，市场最终会完全隐藏信息，且信息披露量对社会而言过多，征税可提高社会福利。
We examine the effect of competition on the incentive of firms to disclose quality to consumers before trade when information disclosure is not costless. We demonstrate that no firm will disclose information in the limit, no matter how small the disclosure cost is; that is, the market outcome converges to complete concealment of information as the number of competing firms becomes larger. Nonetheless, it can be shown that under a mild condition, the equilibrium amount of information disclosure is socially excessive for any number of firms, so discouraging information disclosure by levying a tax may increase social welfare.