Complementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation
利用俄罗斯雇主-雇员匹配面板数据，估计了企业按时或延迟支付工资的战略互补模型，发现邻近企业拖欠工资会降低本企业延迟支付的成本，并存在准时支付和延迟支付两个稳定均衡。
We present and estimate a model with strategic complementarities in firms' choices of on-time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate identification of the endogenous interactions through fixed effects for firms, workers, and local labor markets, and instrumental variables based on policy interventions. The estimated reaction function displays strongly positive neighborhood effects, and the estimated feedback loops-worker quits, effort, strikes, and legal penalties-imply that costs of wage delays are attenuated by neighborhood arrears. We also study a nonlinear case with two stable symmetric equilibria: a punctual payment and a late payment equilibrium. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.