Why Do Manufacturers Issue Coupons? An Empirical Analysis of Breakfast Cereals
分析25种即食早餐麦片的货架价格与制造商优惠券的关系，发现优惠券可用时货架价格更低，这不符合静态垄断价格歧视，支持寡头垄断下的价格歧视模型，并表明优惠券用于诱导重复购买。
We explore the relationship between shelf prices and manufacturers’ coupons for 25 readyto-eat breakfast cereals. We find that shelf prices are lower during periods when coupons are available. This result is inconsistent with static monopoly price discrimination under a broad range of assumptions. We present evidence that is inconsistent with both dynamic theories of price discrimination and explanations of couponing based on the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers. We find support for models of price discrimination in oligopoly settings as well as suggestions that firmwide incentives may induce managers to use coupons and price cuts simultaneously. Finally, lagged coupons have a positive effect on current sales, suggesting that coupons are used to induce repurchase.