Shareholder-Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers
发现股东发起的集体诉讼会导致公司股价显著下跌，且股东会基于同行业其他公司的诉讼提前预期部分损失，导致诉讼公告日的股价反应被低估。
Abstract This paper documents significantly negative stock price reactions to shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits. We find that shareholders partially anticipate these lawsuits based on lawsuit filings against other firms in the same industry and capitalize part of these losses prior to a lawsuit filing date. We show that the more likely a firm is to be sued, the larger the partial anticipation effect (shareholder losses capitalized prior to a lawsuit filing date) and the smaller the filing date effect (shareholder losses measured on the lawsuit filing date). Our evidence suggests that previous research that typically focuses on the filing date effect understates the magnitude of shareholder losses, and that such an understatement is greater for firms with a higher likelihood of being sued.