Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts
证明，对困境机构进行时间一致但不完全精准的救助，会使私人杠杆选择成为战略互补；当大家都搞期限错配时，当局不得不干预，产生当前和未来的社会成本，从而激励银行采取风险资产负债表，这解释了银行风险暴露的相关性及宏观审慎监管的必要性。
The article shows that time-consistent, imperfectly targeted support to distressed institutions makes private leverage choices strategic complements. When everyone engages in maturity mismatch, authorities have little choice but intervening, creating both current and deferred (sowing the seeds of the next crisis) social costs. In turn, it is profitable to adopt a risky balance sheet. These insights have important consequences, from banks choosing to correlate their risk exposures to the need for macro-prudential supervision.