The Location of Firms in Unionized Countries*
研究了在工会化劳动力市场中，企业如何在不同国家间选址，发现工会谈判力量较弱的国家会吸引所有企业，但强工会国家也可能成为稳定集聚地。
Abstract This paper develops a two‐country economic geography model with Cournot competition, where the labor markets are unionized so that trade unions bargain efficiently with each firm over wages and employment. Agglomeration forces are present due to wage premia obtained by the trade unions. It is shown that if the bargaining power of unions differs across countries then, as trade costs are reduced, the country with relatively weak unions gradually acquires all firms. However, for a range of trade costs, it is also a locally stable equilibrium for all firms to locate in the country with strong unions.