盈余管理、资产重组与基于盈余的退市制度下的退市威胁

Earnings Management, Asset Restructuring, and the Threat of Exchange Delisting in an Earnings‐based Regulatory Regime

Corporate Governance: An International Review · 2010
被引 56
ABS 3

中文导读

研究中国基于盈余的退市制度如何影响公司财务报告管理,发现面临退市风险的公司会更多使用盈余管理和资产重组来避免退市,且两者存在替代关系。

Abstract

ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study examines the effect of an earnings‐based listing regulation on corporate financial reporting management. In 2001, China revised its listing standards requiring compulsory stock suspension for firms reporting three‐year consecutive losses. Suspended stocks are further delisted if they continue to report losses in the year of stock suspension. Research Findings/Insights: Our results show that firms approaching the delisting procedure use more earnings management, although the effect is minor. Meanwhile, we observe that delisting risk induces extensive performance‐enhancing asset restructuring activities. For firms turning losses into profits, our evidence suggests a negative relationship between earnings management and asset restructuring. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study extends the earnings management literature by suggesting that earnings management to avoid losses is likely to increase with the severity of the losses and decline with asset restructuring activities. In addition, this research adds to the literature on the economic consequences of the delisting process. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The study provides evidence that an earnings‐based delisting regulation is a double‐edged sword which leads to either earnings management or performance‐enhancing asset restructuring activities. By pointing out the earnings management and restructuring effects of the Chinese delisting regime, we may inform policy makers of the economic consequences of an earnings‐based regime. This adds to prior evidence on the effects of market‐based delisting thresholds. In addition, the study highlights that the earnings‐based delisting regulation does not create a level playing field, since state‐controlled firms are at an advantage to use more government‐led asset restructurings through state‐owned shareholders in order to avoid delisting.

盈余管理资产重组退市制度中国资本市场公司治理