SCHOOL QUALITY AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE HOUSING MARKET
研究了住房市场中卖家是否披露当地公立学校信息的行为，发现高分学校附近的卖家更可能主动披露，且这种策略性行为在信息获取成本较低时更少，但信息披露本身不影响房价。
In this article, we investigate the relationship between school quality and information disclosure in housing markets. When presented with the option of identifying their local public school in a real estate listing, we find that sellers with homes assigned to higher‐performing schools are more likely to provide this information. We find more evidence of selective disclosure in 2001–2002 than in 2006–2007, when the costs of gathering and disclosing information on school assignments and quality were lower. Furthermore, we find more evidence of strategic behavior among sellers of large single‐family units that presumably appeal to families with children. After controlling for school quality, information disclosure does not appear to affect housing prices. Taken together, our results support the findings of the education literature on the importance of school quality capitalization in residential real estate and they provide the first evidence of strategic information disclosure in housing markets .