Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation, and Collusive Behavior
研究重复寡头模型中局部竞争（也可视为多市场运营）下的合谋行为，发现私人信息导致企业不应采用过于严厉的惩罚策略，标准奖惩策略在所有折现因子下都过于严厉，而修正后的奖惩策略适用范围更窄。
This paper studies collusive behavior in a repeated oligopoly model with localized competition, also reinterpreted as a model of multimarket operation. Private information about the rivals' past actions naturally arises from these product market structures. The resulting communication problems imply that firms should not adopt strategies with too severe punishments. Infinite grim punishments may be too severe, for large discount factors. The standard stick-and-carrot punishments from the perfect public information model are always too severe, for all discount factors. Modified stick-and-carrot punishments can still be used, though for a smaller range of discount factors than the standard stick-and-carrot punishments.