An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting
分析了一个无初始财富的企业家与一个富裕投资者之间的不完全长期金融契约，探讨如何通过初始契约设计或控制权分配来协调双方目标冲突，并论证了标准债务融资中控制权分配的最优性。
We analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth and a wealthy investor. Both agents have potentially conflicting objectives since the entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the project while the investor is only concerned about monetary returns. We address the questions of (i) whether and how the initial contract can be structured in such a way as to bring about a perfect coincidence of objectives between both agents (ii) when the initial contract cannot achieve this coincidence of objectives how should control rights be allocated to achieve efficiency? One of the main results of our analysis concerns the optimality properties of the (contingent) control allocation induced by standard debt financing. © 1992 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.