Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms
构建了一个理论，解释在产权不受国家侵犯保障的环境中，地方政府所有权如何通过整合政府与企业活动，限制国家掠夺、增加公共品供给并减少收入隐藏，从而在中国向市场经济转型中取得成功。
We develop a theory of the ownership of firms in an environment without secure property rights against state encroachment. “Private ownership” leads to excessive revenue hiding, and “state ownership” (i.e., national government ownership) fails to provide incentives for managers and local governments in a credible way. Because “local government ownership” integrates local government activities and business activities, local government may better serve the interests of the national government, and thus local government ownership may credibly limit state predation, increase local public goods provision, and reduce costly revenue hiding. We use our theory to interpret the relative success of local government-owned firms during China's transition to a market economy.