Why Stakeholders Ignore Firm Misconduct
从认知角度解释利益相关者为何不一致地惩罚企业不当行为，指出注意力分配有限导致不当行为常不受惩罚，从而限制了社会控制对不当行为的威慑效果。
This article explains inconsistency in stakeholder punishment for firm misconduct. It does so by developing a cognitive view of the process by which stakeholders allocate their limited attention. This cognitive view outlines individual and situational factors that produce variation in a stakeholder’s likelihood of noticing that an act of misconduct has occurred, in how the stakeholder will assess misconduct if he or she does notice it, and in the stakeholder’s decision to punish a firm if he or she judges it to have engaged in misconduct. In sum, this process suggests that as stakeholder attention varies across each step of this process, misconduct often will not result in punishment. This suggests limits on the ability to deter firm misconduct through social control.