DECENTRALIZED TRADE MITIGATES THE LEMONS PROBLEM*
研究了在逆向选择市场中，分散交易如何使高低质量商品都能成交（尽管有延迟），并在摩擦较小时实现高于竞争均衡的剩余，从而缓解柠檬问题。
In markets with adverse selection, only low‐quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when the average quality of the good held by sellers is low. We show that under decentralized trade, however, both high‐ and low‐quality units trade, although with delay. Moreover, when frictions are small, the surplus realized is greater than the (static) competitive surplus. Thus, decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem. Remarkably, payoffs are competitive as frictions vanish, even though both high‐ and low‐quality units continue to trade, and there is trade at several prices.