Competition, Cooperation, and Corporate Culture
通过模型说明，在竞争性劳动力市场中，如果工人有异质的社会偏好且偏好是私人信息，工人会自我选择进入不同激励和合作水平的企业，从而解释企业间合作水平的差异以及非营利与营利企业共存的现象。
Cooperation between workers can be of substantial value to a firm, yet its level often varies substantially between firms. We show that these differences can unfold in a competitive labor market if workers have heterogeneous social preferences and preferences are private information. In our model, workers differ in their willingness to cooperate voluntarily. We show that there always exists a separating equilibrium in which workers self‐select into firms that differ in their monetary incentives as well as their level of worker cooperation. Our model highlights the role of sorting and worker heterogeneity in the emergence of heterogeneous corporate cultures. It also provides a new explanation for the coexistence of nonprofit and for‐profit firms. “Here you don’t communicate. And sometimes you end up not knowing things. … Everyone says we need effective communication. But it’s a low priority in action. … The hardest thing at the gates when flights are delayed is to get information.” Customer service supervisor, American Airlines “There is constant communication between service and the ramp. When planes have to be switched and bags must be moved, customer service will advise the ramp directly or through operations. If there’s an aircraft swap operations keeps everyone informed. … It happens smoothly.” Customer service supervisor, Southwest Airlines 1