ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS
研究了在不完全竞争市场中，企业出于战略考虑如何影响信息的获取与传播，即使信息免费也可能选择不获取信息，并用一个简单的斯塔克尔伯格模型加以说明。
In imperfectly competitive markets, incentives for the acquisition and dissemination of information by prices is significantly affected by strategic considerations. Since prices reveal information, firms possessing market power may choose to set prices which are either biased or not adjusted to all available information so as to distort their information content. Even when information is costlessly available strategic considerations may lead firms to remain uninformed. These results are illustrated in a simple Stackelberg model with price‐setting firms where the pricing game is preceded by an information acquisition game.