Intergenerational Altruism, Dynastic Equilibria and Social Welfare
探讨王朝均衡的福利性质，发现弱条件下福利最优无法通过正转移的王朝均衡实现，代际利他主义导致社会规划者目标动态不一致，但若规划者承诺尊重已故世代偏好且前代足够多，则王朝均衡近似福利最优。
The purpose of this paper is to explore the welfare properties of dynastic equilibria. There are three central findings. First, under relatively weak conditions, welfare optima cannot be implemented as dynastic equilibria with positive levels of transfers. Second, intergenerational altruism ordinarily renders the objectives of social planners dynamically inconsistent, thereby making implementation of welfare optima problematic. Third, if a planner successfully resolves dynamic inconsistency by committing himself to respect the preferences of deceased generations, and if there are a sufficient number of prior generations, then in a specific set of cases dynastic equilibria are approximately welfare optimal.