From Search to Match: When Loan Contracts Are Too Long
建立了一个贷款模型，银行与企业家在搜索过程中匹配，项目随机产生短期或需展期的长期回报。模型发现，在特定参数下存在无展期和有展期两种稳态，且展期社会无效率；不完全信息下标准债务合同虽私人有效，但会扩大社会无效率展期的均衡范围，并导致危机突然发生，具有净化效应。
A model of lending is presented where loans are established in matches between banks (lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers) who meet in a search process. Projects turn out randomly a quick payoff or a long‐term payoff that requires a rollover of the loan. The model generates, under proper parameter conditions, two steady states without or with rollover, and rollover is socially inefficient. Under imperfect information, the standard debt contract is privately efficient. However, it extends the domains of equilibria with socially inefficient rollover. The global dynamics displays a continuum of equilibrium paths that each exhibits sudden discontinuities—crises—in which the mass of outstanding loans is reduced by a quantum amount of terminations. Crises have a cleansing effect.