Estimating a War of Attrition: The Case of the US Movie Theater Industry
研究了美国1950年代电影院行业在需求下降时企业的战略性退出决策，量化了战略互动导致的退出延迟平均为2.7年。
This paper empirically studies firm's strategic exit decisions in an environment where demand is declining. Specifically, I quantify the extent to which the exit process generated by firms' strategic interactions deviates from the outcome that maximizes industry profits. I develop and estimate a dynamic exit game using data from the US movie theater industry in the 1950s, when the industry faced demand declines. Using the estimated model, I quantify the magnitude of strategic delays and find that strategic interactions cause an average delay of exit of 2.7 years. I calculate the relative importance of several components of these strategic delays.