Competition within a Cartel: League Conduct and Team Conduct in the Market for Baseball Player Services
构建了一个区分联盟与球队行为的模型，分析联盟规则对球员薪资的限制，并利用1986-1991年数据检验发现联盟限制在后期减弱，但球队始终是竞争性价格接受者。
A model of major league baseball is developed which distinguishes between league behavior and individual team behavior.The league is viewed as setting rules that restrict the team's willingness to pay and/or impose costs on the transfer of players between teams. Given these rules, teams then compete for player services. The model is estimated and tested. The evidence suggests that the restrictive effect of league rules on player salaries declined between 1986-1988 and 1989-1991, consistent with anecdotal evidence. Within the rules established by the league, however, teams appear to behave as competitive price-takers through the entire sample period. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology