Optimal linear contracts with heterogeneous agents
研究了在代理人能力异质时，线性契约的最优形式，发现无交易成本下应是个性化契约，但现实中少见，原因可能是交易成本或动态激励。
This paper examines the class of linear contracts in a simple principal--agent model in which agents are heterogeneous in their abilities to perform a task for the principal. We show that in the absence of transaction costs, the optimal linear contract is a set of individualised contracts. The fact that individualised contracts are rarely observed may be explained by the presence of transaction costs. The equilibrium that emerges depends on the costs of screening relative to the heterogeneity in agents' abilities. In the monopsony case, the dynamic incentives of the agents preclude individualised contracts even if transaction costs are not significant. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.