Unveiling de Soto's mystery: property rights, capital formation, and development
实证检验德·索托假说，发现产权安全通过影响财富、抵押品和资本形成，对发展中国家经济增长有显著促进作用。
Abstract Hernando de Soto attributes the poor economic performance of developing countries to insecure property rights. When property rights are not well-defined individuals do not have the incentives to invest in capital, and assets cannot be used as collateral, hindering capital formation and economic growth. This paper tests de Soto's hypothesis empirically by examining how the security of property rights impacts wealth, collateral, and capital formation across nations. Using several different measures and model specifications, we find support for de Soto's conjecture. Our results suggest that better defined property rights would result in substantial improvements in capital formation and economic growth in developing countries.