The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
研究了在频繁行动的重复博弈中，信息类型如何影响激励提供的方式：泊松跳跃可用于转移支付和价值销毁，而连续布朗信息只能通过转移支付提供激励。
We show that in repeated interactions the avenues for effective provision of incentives depend crucially on the type of information players observe. We establish this conclusion for general repeated two-player games in which information arrives via a continuous-time stationary process that has a continuous multidimensional Brownian component and a Poisson component, and in which the players act frequently. The Poisson jumps can be used to effectively provide incentives both with transfers and value burning, while continuous Brownian information can be used to provide incentives only with transfers. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.