The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
分析委托人有私人信息时的委托代理关系，建立三阶段非合作博弈模型，证明均衡存在且帕累托最优，委托人比代理人知情时做得更好。
We analyze the principal-agent relationship when the principal has private information as a three-stage noncooperative game: contract proposal, acceptance/refusal, and contract execution. We assume that the information does not directly affect the agent's payoff (private values). Equilibrium exists and is generically locally unique. Moreover, it is Pareto optimal for the different types of principal. The principal generically does strictly better than when the agent knows her information. Equilibrium allocations are the Walrasian equilibria of an economy where the traders are different types of principal and exchange the slack on the agent's individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints.