Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance
利用美国雇主近万份长期残疾保单数据，发现更短的等待期和更高的替代率会增加残疾索赔发生率，其中60%的效应源于对短期索赔的机械截断，其余来自对持续超过等待期的索赔的威慑。
Exploiting within-firm, over-time variation in plan parameters for nearly 10,000 Long Term Disability (LTD) policies held by US employers, we present the first empirical analysis of the determinants of private LTD spells. We find that a shorter waiting period and a higher replacement rate increase the incidence of LTD spells. Sixty percent of the latter effect is due to the mechanical censoring of shorter spells, with the remainder due to the deterrence of spells that would have continued beyond the waiting period. Deterrence is driven primarily by a reduction in the incidence of shorter duration spells and less severe disabilities.