Self‐Insurance and Self‐Protection as Public Goods
研究了具有自我保险或自我防护性质的公共物品，分析了有效公共供给水平与纳什行为下的私人供给水平，并考察了市场保险对公共物品供给的影响。
Abstract Many public goods provide utility by insuring against hazardous events. Those public goods can have self‐insurance and self‐protection character. For both situations we analyze the efficient public provision level and the provision level resulting from Nash behavior in a private provision game. We consider the interaction of public goods as insurance devices with market insurance. The availability of market insurance reduces the provision level of the public good for both public and private provision, regardless of whether we consider self‐insurance or self‐protection. Moreover, we show that Nash behavior has always a larger impact than the availability of market insurance.