Bailouts and Financial Fragility
研究在有限承诺的金融中介模型中，危机时对投资者的救助会扭曲事前激励，导致中介过度缺乏流动性并加剧金融脆弱性；但禁止救助未必最优，而征收短期负债税可改善资源配置并促进金融稳定。
Should policy makers be prevented from bailing out investors in the event of a crisis? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the policy maker will respond with fiscal transfers that partially cover intermediaries' losses. The anticipation of this bailout distorts <it>ex ante</it> incentives, leading intermediaries to become excessively illiquid and increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, however: while it induces intermediaries to become more liquid, it may nevertheless lower welfare and leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis. A policy of taxing short-term liabilities, in contrast, can both improve the allocation of resources and promote financial stability.