The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: an indirect evolutionary approach
用间接演化方法分析道德偏好（如信任）与法律制度（如法院裁决和法律保险）如何相互影响，发现偏好识别能力会促进道德，从而削弱法院等公共机构的作用；但当无法识别偏好类型时，法律制度对道德的出现至关重要。
Moral behavior and legal institutions coevolve. While evolutionary game theory has often analyzed the evolution of moral behavior within given institutional rules, it has not examined the coevolution of moral preferences and different institutional aspects of the decision environment. By an ‘indirect’ evolutionary approach, we analyze the coevolution of moral preferences (in the sense of trustworthiness) and legal institutions like court rulings and legal insurance. We find that preference detection capabilities crowd in morality and can thus render useless the role of courts and legal insurance as public institutions. Legal institutions become crucial for the emergence of morality, however, when information about preference types is not available. This holds true even when courts do not have superior detection capabilities than other agents.