PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING*
利用啤酒消费税翻倍的自然实验，比较伯特兰-纳什、领导者和合谋三种定价模型，发现极端合谋可被排除，但多个模型都能解释实际价格。
This study utilizes a brand‐level dataset that captures a unique natural experiment, a 100% increase in the excise tax, to evaluate different pricing models in the U.S. beer industry. To assess the plausibility of different models, the increase in marginal cost resulting from the tax increase is exploited: observed prices in the post‐increase period are compared to the prices that should be observed under various pricing models. Three types of models are analyzed: Bertrand‐Nash, leadership, and collusion. Results indicate that extreme cases of collusion can be confidently ruled out while several models may explain the observed prices equally well.