Diverging Paths: Accounting for Corporate Governance in America and Germany
研究了20世纪初美国和德国会计制度的分化：美国因股权革命转向面向股东的未来盈利能力评估，而德国因一战和政治摩擦导致会计原则由银行、税法等主导，直到近年才在欧盟和全球资本市场压力下开始重新趋同。
American and German accountancy took different paths in the early part of the twentieth century. In Germany, a persistent disconnect arose between relatively sophisticated managerial accounting practices for insiders and the methods used in public financial accounting. The “equity revolution” America experienced—an enormous shift in the number and expectations of shareholders—prompted new demands for financial statements designed to help evaluate the future earning power of companies. In contrast, the effects of World War I retarded equity–market development in Germany. Political frictions reinforced the Germans's; discomfort with equity markets and increased their resistance to revising accounting principles. Banks, tax law, courts, and lawyers, instead of professional accountants, became the primary source of accounting principles. Only in past decades, under pressure from the European Union and global capital markets, have the accounting systems begun to reconverge.