COMPETITIVE SEARCH, EFFICIENCY, AND MULTIWORKER FIRMS*
研究了多工人企业竞争性搜寻均衡中的效率问题，发现企业可雇佣多人时均衡存在工资分散且招聘效率低下，效率需企业承诺雇佣人数或支付依赖申请人数的工资。
I study competitive search equilibrium in an environment where firms operate a decreasing‐returns production technology and hire multiple workers simultaneously. Firms post wages, possibly several of them. The equilibrium can feature wage dispersion even though all firms and workers are ex ante identical. Unlike the benchmark where firms hire a single worker, hiring is constrained inefficient. Efficiency requires that firms commit to the number of hires, pay all applicants, or pay wages that depend on the number of applicants. Under wage‐posting, the inefficiency is highest at intermediate levels of labor market tightness.